Abstract: Agricultural green development is an important part of ecological civilization construction and sustainable development. With the background of consumers' green preference demand, it develops a Stackelberg game model dominated by manufacturer, to explore the promotion effect of revenue-sharing contract on the green investment level, pricing and profit of agricultural supply chain, and analyzes its sensitivity to consumers' green preference. The findings can be concluded as follows. Firstly, the revenue-sharing contract can not only raise the green investment level of agricultural supply chain, but also reduce the price of agricultural products. Secondly, the revenue-sharing contract can improve the system profit of agricultural supply chain. Thirdly, consumers' green preference has a positive effect, which will not only directly promote the green investment and system profit of agricultural supply chain, but also indirectly promote the green investment and system profit of agricultural supply chain by enhancing the role of the revenue-sharing contract. Based on these findings, this thesis puts forward solutions and suggestions for green development of agricultural supply chain from the perspective of government and supply chain.