Purpose/Significance Collective action with voluntary cooperation is still an important supply mode of rural public goods in China. However, many collective actions in rural areas end in failureat present. The purpose and significance of this study is to actively introduce social capital from the perspective of farmers'voluntary participation in supply, promote farmers from non-cooperative game to cooperative game, so as to solve the dilemma of cooperative supply of rural public goods.

Method/Process By constructing two game models under complete rationality and social embeddedness, the Nash equilibrium solution in static and dynamic models is explored, and the reasons for the success or failure of rural collective cooperative behavior are expounded.

Result/Conclusion The results of the game model show that farmer households are prone to fall into collective dilemma in a completely rational static game, while the social capital embedding provides the possibility for farmer households to get out of the non-cooperative game dilemma and establish a broad sense of cooperation. Therefore, the government can actively guide farmer households from cooperative game to cooperative game by protecting and cultivating social capital, maintaining social norms, establishing rewards and punishments mechanism, and innovating multiple modes of suppliers.