Abstract: In the manufacturer-led third-party recycling closed-loop supply chain, this paper models the retailer's fair concern behavior, and discusses the optimal decision based on Stackelberg game. The research finds that fairness concern behavior can increase retailers’ profits and achieve the best utility, but it damages the profits of manufacturers and third-party recyclers. The profit of manufacturers and third-party recyclersis the decreasing function of fairness concern, while the profit of retailers is the increasing function of fairness concern. In the closed-loop supply chain, the channel share of third-party recyclers is the least, while the channel share of manufacturers and retailers depends on the retailer's fair concern, and the inflection point is about 0.5. In addition, the utility function of the closed-loop supply chain system decreases monotonously with little influence under weak fairness concern, and increases monotonously with great influence under strong fairness concern.