Abstract: Based on the typical cases of corporate compliance published by the Supreme People's Procuratorate, the essence of reverse linkage between administrative procedure and criminal procedure for corporate compliance mainly encompasses three aspects: First, the involvement of administrative authorities in initiating, supervising, and evaluating the compliance inspection of the involved enterprises; Second, administrative authorities' adoption of prosecutorial opinions on lenient punishment for compliance from the procuratorial organs; Third, administrative authorities' continuous compliance supervision to promote industry-wide compliance development. However, not all procuratorial and administrative organs can cooperate as smoothly and seamlessly as in typical compliance cases. In practice, administrative organs face challenges in implementing lenient compliance and continuing compliance supervision. The procuratorial-led corporate compliance reform has certain limitations in ensuring compliance quality and effectiveness and in achieving compliance incentives. Therefore, a reverse linkage mechanism between administrative procedure and criminal procedure for corporate compliance should be constructed from the dimensions of concept, substance, and procedure. Conceptually, the traditional thinking of "procuratorial dominance" should be broken, and a new pattern of participation involving multiple entities such as administrative, judicial, and corporate bodies should be established. Substantively, the attribution model of corporate administrative liability should be reshaped to solve the legal dilemmas of lenient punishment for compliance. Procedurally, the establishment of a third-party mechanism committee should be leveraged to shift from "result recognition" to "process participation".