Abstract: The paper gives detailed analysis of the 2007—2014 panel data of 16 Chinese listed commercial banks. And two proxy variables are introduced: the large state-owned enterprises in China and financial crisis. The thesis studies how the system of incentive payment for the management affects the risk-taking of the listed banks, the corporate value and its business performance during the financial crisis by the empirical research. The researchers have found that there exists a positive correlation between the risk exposure and the scheme of the incentive payment for the management in the commercial banks. In the period of financial crisis, the executive compensation can't put more pressures on the banks. For example, the five state-owned banks in China can't take more significant risks for the system of incentive payment. On the whole, all the indexes of the enterprises are positively related to the incentive salary. The negative correlation exists between the enterprise's performance and the incentive payment for the management. The more incentive payment for the bank management can promote its values, but lower its performance.